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ESSAY
OF PITCAIRN'S ISLAND AND AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY
DAN T. COENEN*
Few tales from human experience are more compelling than
that of the mutiny on the Bounty and its extraordinary after-
math. On April 28, 1789, crew members of the Bounty, led by
Fletcher Christian, seized the ship and its commanding officer,
William Bligh.' After being set adrift with eighteen sympathiz-
ers in the Bounty's launch, Bligh navigated to landfall across
3600 miles of ocean in "the greatest open-boat voyage in the his-
tory of the sea."2 Christian, in the meantime, recognized that
only the gallows awaited him in England and so laid plans to
start a new and hidden life in the South Pacific.' After briefly
returning to Tahiti, Christian set sail for the most untraceable
of destinations: the uncharted and uninhabited Pitcairn's Is-
* Professor, University of Georgia Law School. B.S., 1974, University of Wiscon-
sin; J.D., 1978, Cornell Law School. The author thanks Philip and Madeline
VanDyck for introducing him to the tale of Pitcairn's Island. He also appreciates the
useful research and cite-checking assistance provided by Jennifer Ann Taylor and J.
Michael Wiggins.
1. See CHARLES NoRDHoFF & JAMES N. HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND 4 (1934) [here-
inafter NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCARN'S ISLAND]. The full tale of the mutiny, Bligh's
open-boat voyage, and the mutineers' later experiences is presented, in historical-nov-
el form, in a trilogy by Nordhoff and Hall. The first volume in the series, Mutiny on
the Bounty, originally published in 1932, tells of the mutiny. CHARLES NORDHOFF &
JAMES N. HALL, MUTINY ON THE BOUNTY (1932) [hereinafter NORDHOFF & HALL,
MUTINY ON THE BOUNTY]. The second volume, Men Against the Sea, published in
1934, recounts Bligh's famous voyage. CHARLES NORDHOFF & JAMES N. HALL, MEN
AGAINST THE SEA (1934). The third volume, Pitcairn's Island, supra, also published
in 1934, describes the fate of Christian and those who accompanied him following
the mutiny.
2. NORDHOFF & HALL, PrrCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at 240.
3. See id. at 32-33.
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land.4 On this island, Christian's coterie of nine English sailors,
six Tahitian men, and twelve Tahitian women established a so-
ciety disconnected from the rest of the world.' According to the
best-known account of these settlers' experiences--Charles
Nordhoff's and James N. Hall's Pitcairn's Island-Christian also
established a government for the colony based on the principle of
pure democracy.6
It is a curiosity of history that the mutiny aboard the Bounty
occurred in the same year-some might even say the same
week-that the national government organized under the Con-
stitution of the United States came into being.7 The republican
form of government established by that Constitution now has
endured more than two centuries, while the polity established
on Pitcairn's Island lasted, according to Nordhoff and Hall, no
more than four brief years.' These contrasting histories invite
the question whether the failed experiment in democracy on
Pitcairn's Island offers insight into the durability of our own
constitutional regime.
To hold out the account provided by Nordhoff and Hall as an
accurate touchstone for true comparative legal analysis would be
emphatically wrong. Their tale, after all, is more a novel than a
history9 and, even in its broad outlines, rests largely on infer-
ence and surmise.0 Additionally, even if Nordhoff and Hall's
account were accurate in every detail, greatly differing social
conditions would render treacherous any fruitful comparison of
the government of America and that of Pitcairn's Island. None-
4. See id. at 4-7.
5. See id. at 4-5, 60-64.
6. See id. at 35.
7. The first National Congress convened on March 4, 1789. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 145 (Richard B. Morris ed., 6th ed. 1982). George Washington
was inaugurated as President on April 30, 1789. See THE WORLD ALMANAC AND
BOOK OF FACTS 498 (1996). The mutiny on the Bounty occurred on April 28, 1789.
See NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at 4.
8. See NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at vii, 244.
9. See generally id. passim. The Nordhoff and Hall account is related primarily
as a present-tense drama.
10. See id. at vii (acknowledging that the authors, after studying various accounts
of the events on Pitcairn's Island, "adopted a chronology and selected a sequence of
events which seem to them to render more plausible" the story that unfolded on the
island).
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theless, the tale of Pitcairn's Island provides a useful allegory
for reflecting on the American constitutional experiment.1 In
particular, the stark simplicity of the Pitcairners' tale pushes
into bold relief our own Constitution's complex organizing
principles: fear of majority faction, the preference for checked
and divided powers, and the evolutionary inclusion in the politi-
cal process of all persons affected by it.' The story of the set-
tlers of Pitcairn's Island suggests the wisdom of these key ele-
ments of American constitutional theory, while a study of Ameri-
can constitutional theory raises the question whether those
same settlers, in those same circumstances, would have met a
different fate had they opted for a different set of governmental
structures.
I. THE TALE OF PITCAIBN'S ISLAND
After "careful study of every existing account,"" Charles
Nordhoff and James N. Hall published Pitcairn's Island in
1934."' According to the authors, "discrepancies and improb-
abilities" marked earlier chronicles of the island's settlement.
15
As a result, the authors "selected a sequence of events which
seem[ed] to them to render more plausible the play of cause and
effect." 6 Although little is known with certainty about what
happened on Pitcairn's Island, the broad outlines of the Nordhoff
11. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 416 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961) (noting that differences between America and the Greek city-states
"render extreme circumspection necessary, in reasoning from one case to the other,"
but that "after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained,
that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy
of our attention).
12. See infra Part H.
13. NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at vii.
14. See supra note 1.
15. NoRDHOFF & HALL, PITcAiRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at vii.
16. Id.
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and Hall chronology seem inherently plausible.17 Their tale
may be summarized as follows.
In late December 1789, Fletcher Christian and his Tahitian
wife, Maimiti, first set foot on Pitcairn's Island. I" With Chris-
tian were eight other Englishmen and their eight Tahitian
wives, three Tahitian noblemen and their three wives, and three
unmarried Tahitian men.19 After salvaging all that was of val-
ue from the Bounty, Christian set the ship ablaze.2 ' The set-
tlers were on Pitcairn's Island to stay.
Before leaving the vessel, Christian had called a meeting of
the Englishmen to discuss the governance of the colony. At this
meeting, Christian proposed, and the Englishmen agreed, that
each of them would have an equal vote in the settlement's af-
fairs.21 Christian opted for a system of pure democratic rule de-
spite the misgivings voiced by his chief assistant and closest
confidant, Edwin Young.22 Although Young found trustworthy
17. Later treatments of the settlement of Pitcairn's Island are based largely on
the report of Captain Beechy, who visited the island in 1825, and whose account
purports to contain quotations from the diary of the settler Edwin Young. See HAR-
RY L. SHAPIRO, THE HERITAGE OF THE BOUNTY 58 (1936). The Beechy account gener-
ally corresponds with the Nordhoff and Hall chronology, although it does not suggest
(for example) that the land-division scheme discussed in detail infra directly contrib-
uted to the cataclysmic attempt of the Tahitian settlers to kill off their English com-
panions. Instead, according to the Beechy account, the plan to kill the Englishmen
resulted from the generalized and continuing ill-treatment of the natives, particularly
by Matthew Quintal and William McCoy. See id. at 61.
Consistent with the Nordhoff and Hall version, however, the Beechy account re-
ports that all but four of the Englishmen were killed in the immediate wake of an
uprising instigated by the islanders. See id. at 64. Several authors have suggested
that a division of the land, solely among the Englishmen, occurred immediately upon
settlement of the island. See IAN M. BALL, PITCAIRN: CHILDREN OF MUTINY 104-11
(1973); SIR JOHN BARROW, A DESCRIPTION OF PITCAIRN'S ISLAND AND ITS INHABIT-
ANTS 261 (New York, J. & J. Harper 1833);, LADY BELCHER, THE MUTINEERS OF THE
BOUNTY AND THEIR DESCENDANTS IN PITCAIRN AND NORFOLK ISLANDS 156-60 (New
York, Harper & Bros. 1871); ROBERT B. NICOLSON, THE PrrcAIRNERS 36-53 (1965);
SHAPIRO, supra at 59-65. The discrepancy in accounts, of course, reinforces the im-
portance of viewing the Nordhoff and Hall account as providing useful insight into
American constitutionalism solely by way of literary allegory, rather than historical
comparison. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
18. See NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at 3-4, 8, 17-18.
19. See id. at 2, 62.
20. See id. at 37-59.
21. See id. at 35.
22. See id. at 35-36.
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two of the mutineers-sailor Alexander Smith and the Bounty's
assistant botanist, Edwin Brown-he knew that the other five
Englishmen-Isaac Martin, William McCoy, John Mills, Mat-
thew Quintal, and John Williams-were rough seamen who
might lapse into unwise judgment.' Christian responded that
justice demanded an equal vote for all whom he had induced to
join him in his venture.' He also expressed the hope that he
and Young could "direct" the men "to wise decisions" by provid-
ing them with sound counsel.'
At first, things went well. The island covered only four square
miles, but it offered all that was necessary for a good life: fresh
water, rich soil, fruit-bearing trees, and fish and game for the
catching.26 The settlers successfully divided tasks among them-
selves and worked hard at constructing shelters and cultivating
yams and breadfruit.'7 All shared the island's produce, and this
communal economy provided amply for seamen and islanders
alike.' Although the Englishmen were not religious,29 they ac-
commodated the islanders' own traditional religious practices."
There was no illness,"' and within a year Maimiti gave birth to
the island's first child. 2
As time passed, however, the five Englishmen of whom Young
had given warning became increasingly insensitive toward the
Tahitians. Williams initiated an adulterous relationship with
Hutia, the wife of Tararu, and came to blows with the Tahitian
leader, Minarii, over this insult to Minarii's family." Martin
23. See id. at 30, 35-36, 64.
24. See id at 36.
25. Id
26. See id at 18-20.
27. See id at 63-75.
28. See id. at 117.
29. See id. at 64.
30. See i&. at 64, 86-90.
31. See id. at 154.
32. See id. at 109-10.
33. See id. at 140-43. Williams's wife, Fasto, met a bloody end, perhaps by sui-
cide, after learning of her husband's infidelity. See i&. at 82-84. Thereafter, Williams
proposed that he be able to take Hutia as his wife openly. By a vote of six to three
the proposal was rejected. See id. at 95. The vote followed a speech made by Chris-
tian in which he warned that "[dlifferences over women are dangerous at all times,
and in a small community like ours they may have fatal consequences." See id.
1997] 653
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earned the enmity of the islanders by treating both his wife and
the other Polynesians with scorn.' After the ship's rations of
grog were exhausted, McCoy set up a secret distillery to feed his
alcoholic needs.15 Then, after two years of working side-by-side
with the islanders, "certain of the white men took to loafing in
the shade, while they forced the humbler natives to perform the
daily tasks too heavy for womenfolk."36
Relations between the races grew strained. The lower-caste
Tahitian, Hu, a favorite victim of the white men's beatings, tried
unsuccessfully to push Martin from a cliff to his death."
Tararu failed in his attempt to murder Williams, who by that
time had taken away Hutia to live with him.38 Hutia apparent-
ly undertook to poison Tararu in retaliation and, in so doing,
killed both Tararu and Hu.39 Meanwhile, Quintal and McCoy
essentially enslaved the unmarried islander Te Moa, while Mar-
tin and Mills subjected the other lower-caste islander, Nihau, to
similar degradation." "The natives resented their new status
deeply, but so far had not broken out in open revolt."4' Perhaps
this peace prevailed because the Tahitian noblemen, Minarii and
Tetahiti, continued to lead lives of substantial independence and
dignity.
42
As embitterment grew between Englishmen and islanders,
however, McCoy came up with an idea that spelled doom for the
colony: he decided that the useable acreage of the island should
be divided among the Englishmen, with the Tahitians excluded
Christian also cautioned that "[t]o stir up racial strife would be the ruin of us all."
See id. Following the vote, Williams's loneliness caused him to flee the island in the
Bounty's cutter. Christian overtook him in the colony's canoe and returned him to
the island. See id. at 97-98. Thereafter, Williams took to cohabiting openly with
Hutia, see id. at 139, 142-43, and it was this action that led to his fight with
Minarii. See id. at 140-43.
34. See id. at 68, 132.
35. See id. at 128-31.
36. Id. at 127.
37. See id. at 138.
38. See id. at 149-50.
39. See id. at 151, 154-55.
40. See id. at 156-57.
41. Id- at 157.
42. See id. at 157-63.
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from this allotment." After secretly soliciting acceptance of his
plan from Martin, Mills, Quintal, and Williams, McCoy put for-
ward his proposal at a meeting of the English settlers."
Christian was stunned.45 He reminded the mutineers that
Minarii and Tetahiti had been chiefs on Tahiti, where landless
men were deemed outcasts." He described the land-division
plan as "madness" and "charged with fatal consequences.
McCoy's proposal nonetheless carried by a vote of five to four,
although Christian insisted that the action was so consequential
that it required reconsideration at the group's next meeting.4"
Word of the vote was leaked to Tetahiti through Martin's wife,
Susannah.49 When Tetahiti approached Christian and demand-
ed to know if the whites indeed intended to make the islanders
into landless serfs, Christian offered an equivocal response.'o
Tetahiti then set off to find Minarii at the site where he was
building a house. Tetahiti discovered Minarii standing near a
pile of smoldering ashes.5' Quintal had torched the chieftain's
new home.52
A bloodbath followed.' At dawn on September 22, 1793,'
the four surviving Tahitian men launched a sneak attack on the
Englishmen with the intention of killing all of them.55 Within
hours Martin and Mills were beheaded, Williams and Brown
were shot dead, and Christian received a mortal wound.55 A
counterattack engineered by three of the Englishmen's'wives
43. See id. at 159.
44. See id. at 159-62.
45. See id. at 162.
46. See id.
47. Id. at 162-63.
48. See id. at 163. Also, before the men left the meeting, Christian required each
of them to promise not to divulge the vote to the Tahitians. See id.
49. See id. at 167.
50. See id. at 170.
51. See id. at 172.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 180-90.
54. See id. at 244.
55. See id. at 173-80.
56. See id. at 187-90.
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took the lives of Tetahiti, Te Moa, and Niuha.57 Minarii was
killed in a violent battle with Quintal."
There followed on Pitcairn's Island a time of darkness and
debauchery.59  The only surviving males-McCoy, Quintal,
Smith, and Young-fell into a perverse and persistent
drunkenness nourished by McCoy's still.' The men so merci-
lessly beat and humiliated the Tahitian women that they tried
to escape the island with their children in a small boat, avoiding
certain death only because it capsized within rescue distance of
the island.6 The shock of the escape attempt only briefly halted
the men's routine of sloth and abuse. 2 After giving the men
countless opportunities to change their ways, the women sepa-
rated themselves from the men entirely, gathered together both
the island's children and its firearms, and ordered the men to
keep away.' More bloody encounters ensued when the men
ignored these commands." McCoy and Quintal eventually were
driven to madness and death by drink, abandonment, and
guilt.' In time, however, Young and Smith sought forgiveness
from the women and joined them in reestablishing a peaceful
community devoted to the nurture of the children.' Within a
few years Young died, but not before teaching Smith how to read
the Bible that Christian had salvaged from the Bounty.'
In 1808, the American vessel Topaz came upon the settlement
at Pitcairn's Island.' Spiritually reborn, Alexander Smith now
oversaw a community, including more than twenty children,
tutored in an adapted form of Biblical Christianity.69 As
Nordhoff and Hall describe it: "All who were fortunate enough to
57. See id. at 214-16.
58. See id. at 211-12.
59. See id. at 254-65.
60. See id. at 257.
61. See id. at 257-62.
62. See id. at 263.
63. See id. at 263-69.
64. See id. at 273-77, 282.
65. See id. at 291, 302-08.
66. See id. at 298.
67. See id. at 314-18.
68. See id. at viii, 328.
69. See id. at 234, 237, 323-24.
[Vol. 38:649656
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visit the Pitcairn colony during the first quarter of the nine-
teenth century agree that it presented a veritable picture of the
Golden Age."70
II. THE LESSONS OF PITCAiRN'S ISLAND
The tale of Pitcairn's Island provides food for reflection on
almost all that is most troublesome about the human condition:
the proclivity for violence; the drive to racism, sexual domi-
nance, and other forms of class-based oppression; the destructive
force of intoxicants; the stresses of extreme dislocation and
change; and the recurring urge to selfishness even in the face of
plenty. The tale also invites thought on some of the most basic
social issues: the role of religion in society; the proper regulation
of marriage and the sexual impulses; the prospects for commu-
nal utopianism; and the challenge of understanding divisions
among social groups, particularly between men and women. The
tale of Pitcairn's Island, however, is also one of a political state.
In particular, it is the story of a people that adopted a form of
government that induced, or at least failed to avert, societal ca-
tastrophe.
The tale of the failed democratic experiment on Pitcairn's Is-
land highlights three key features of the American constitutional
order: a focus on the problem of majority faction; the chosen so-
lution of divided and checked government; and the insistent ten-
dency throughout American constitutional history toward politi-
cal inclusion.71 According to the Nordhoff and Hall account,
each of these constitutional ingredients was missing in the soci-
ety formed on Pitcairn's Island, which in short order endured a
bloody end.72 A closer look at the unfolding of that cataclysm
highlights the critical role these organizing concepts play in our
own constitutional order.
70. Id. at viii.
71. See infra Part ILA-C.
72. See NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at 138-308.
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A. Fear of Faction
James Madison opened his Federalist No. 10 by explaining:
"Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-construct-
ed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than
its tendency to break and control the violence of faction."3
Madison went on to explain that:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are
united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or
of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.'
Madison emphasized that the greatest danger of oppression in-
hered in the emergence of a majority faction.75 As he put it:
If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied
by the republican principle, which enables the majority to de-
feat its sinister views by regular vote.... When a majority is
included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the
other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or in-
terest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. 6
The tendency to faction, Madison explained, was "sown in the
nature of man" and thus destined to exert itself in any political
community founded on democratic principles.77 Autocracy, Mad-
ison recognized, provided an unacceptable alternative to popular
rule because it posed too grave a risk of despotic or idiosyncratic
policymaking.78 It thus was "the great object" of Madison's con-
stitutional document "[tlo secure the public good and private
rights against the danger of... faction, and at the same time to
preserve the spirit of and the form of popular government."79
The opponents of the Constitution, so-called "antifederalists,"
73. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 129 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright
ed., 1961).
74. Id. at 130.
75. See id. at 132-33; see also 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 48 (Herbert J.
Storing ed., 1981).
76. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 73, at 132.
77. Id. at 131.
78. See id. NO. 51, at 358.
79. Id. NO. 10, supra note 73, at 132.
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were "typically... less likely to see majority faction as the most
dangerous and likely evil of popular government."'
The story of Pitcairn's Island deeply resonates with Madison's
focus on the dangers of factional abuse. The faction that
emerged on the island consisted of five sailors who had drifted
together by reason of common temperament, close quarters, and
a perception of shared self-interest."1 That their shortsighted
legislative plan was one of "oppression" and "injustice"82 is be-
yond question. They sought to gain land through enactment,
rather than effort, and then to enslave the Tahitian male popu-
lation to work that land for them.' "For the framers, the prob-
lem of faction lay partly in the danger that a self-interested
group would obtain governmental power in order to put rights of
property at risk." "4 Moreover, Madison saw clearly the height-
ened vulnerability of identifiable minorities outside the political
and social mainstream to the misdeeds of majority factions.'
Most prophetically, Madison saw that the risk of factional op-
pression was maximized by the sort of governmental structure
that existed on Pitcairn's Island. As he explained:
[Ilt may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I
mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who
assemble and administer the government in person, can ad-
mit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion
or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of
the whole; a communication and concert result from the form
of government itself; and there is nothing to check the in-
ducements to sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious indi-
80. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST supra note 75, at 40; see also id. at 39
(discussing antifederalists' views of majority faction and concluding that it "typically
occupied a less conspicuous place in their catalogue of dangers than in that of the
Federalists").
81. See NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at 127, 159-64.
82. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 73, at 135. The plan's shortsighted-
ness is significant, for a recurring theme of the Federalist Papers was the need to
counter the majority's "immediate interest." Id. at 132.
83. See NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at 157-63.
84. GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (2d ed. 1991).
85. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 73, at 132 (citing potential for self-
interested legislation by "the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most
powerful faction" and the "opportunity and temptation ... given to a predominant
party to trample on the rules of justice").
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vidual. Hence it is that such democracies have ever been
spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found
incompatible with personal security or the rights of property;
and have in general been as short in their lives as they have
been violent in their deaths. 6
Madison's broader point was that the strengthened national
government proposed by the Constitution was greatly preferable
to the atomistic dispersal of powers to the states effected by the
Articles of Confederation. 7 This reform, in Madison's view, pro-
vided a potent safeguard against the emergence of oppressive
factions. As Madison explained, one of the key points of differ-
ence between the representative republican form of government
and the purely democratic form of government was "the greater
number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought
within the compass of republican than of democratic govern-
ment."' According to Madisonian theory:
[I]t is this circumstance principally which renders factious
combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the
latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the
distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the dis-
86. Id. at 133; see also id. No. 9, at 124 (Alexander Hamilton) ("It is impossible
to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensa-
tions of horror and disgust.... ."); id. No. 14, at 151 (James Madison) (noting "the
turbulent democracies of ancient Greece and modern Italy"); id. NO. 63, supra note
11, at 415 (urging that Athenians often experienced "bitter anguish" because they
succumbed to "the tyranny of their own passions").
87.
In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as
that for religious rights.... The degree of security in both cases will
depend on the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed
to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended
under the same government. This view of the subject must particularly
recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate
friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion
as the territory of the Union may be formed into more circumscribed
Confederacies, or States, oppressive combinations of a majority will be
facilitated ....
Id. No. 51, supra note 78, at 358; see also id. NO. 10, supra note 73, at 129-30 (not-
ing widespread complaints that within existing states "measures are too often decid-
ed, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party, but by
the superior force of an interested and overbearing mjority").
88. Id. NO. 10, supra note 73, at 135.
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tinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majori-
ty be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of
individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the com-
pass within which they are placed, the most easily will they
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the
sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and inter-
ests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole
will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citi-
zens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more diffi-
cult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it
may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of un-
just or dishonorable purposes, communication is always
checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose con-
currence is necessary.
Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which
a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of
faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,-is en-
joyed by the Union over the States composing it. 9
Madison's antifederalist opponents argued that he had things
backwards. In their view, local democratic control provided the
89. Id.; see 1 THE REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 136 (Max
Farrand ed., 1937); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 11, at 415 (noting
that one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic is "that a peo-
ple spread over an extensive region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small
district, be subject to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of combining
in pursuit of unjust measures"). Federalists also believed that representative govern-
ment helped to counter the emergence of factions because "the people collectively
play no part [in such a government, so that] the danger of popular excesses is
thereby reduced." 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 43. Federal-
ists further contended that an extended republic mitigated the risk of factional ex-
cesses by offering the best chance of attracting the finest political talent to serve as
government representatives. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 73, at 134
(arguing that in a national government "it will be more difficult for unworthy candi-
dates to practise with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often car-
ried; and [that government] will be more likely to centre in men who possess the
most attractive merit"); see also 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75,
at 45 ("For the Federalists, then, representation is a mode of selecting for rulers the
best men, or at least men better than average; and the large districts of the large
republic increases the chance of securing such men."). For a critical appraisal of
Madison's The Federalist No. 10, see Richard A. Epstein, The Federalist Papers:
From Practical Politics to High Principle, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 13, 18-20
(1993).
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best form of governance because it induced active, hands-on par-
ticipation in the operation of the state and a resulting "civic vir-
tue-the willingness of citizens to subordinate their private in-
terests to the general good."" Thus, for many antifederalists,
"[tihe model for government was the town meeting."91 Repre-
sentative government was tolerable to antifederalists only be-
cause it was a necessity; pure democracy, at least in the legisla-
tive department, was the political ideal.92
The tale of Pitcairn's Island suggests that the Madisonians
possessed a sounder understanding of the interplay of human
nature and popular, local self-rule. For two separate reasons,
however, antifederalists might say that the tale of Pitcairn's Is-
land provides an ill-fitting allegory for assessing their argument
for small-scale democratic governance.
First, the antifederalist might observe that the prospect of
enlightened self-rule springs from the existence of a community of
90. STONE ET AL., supra note 84, at 5. Thus, for antifederalists, "[iut was thought
to have been demonstrated, historically and theoretically, that free, republican gov-
ernments could extend only over a relatively small territory with a homogeneous
population." 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 15. The root of
this thinking was that "the small republic . . . reminds each man of the benefits
derived from and the duties owed to his little community." Id. at 20. In addition:
Only a small republic can enjoy a voluntary attachment of the people to
the government and a voluntary obedience to the laws. Only a small re-
public can secure a genuine responsibility of the government to the peo-
ple. Only a small republic can form the kind of citizens who will main-
tain republican government.
Id. at 16.
91. STONE ET AL., supra note 84, at 5 (emphasis added).
92. See 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 43 ("In the main,
the Anti-Federalists accepted representation reluctantly, as a necessary device in a
community where the people cannot assemble to do their common business. The
representative body is seen in consequence as a substitute for an assembly of all the
citizens . . . .") (emphasis added); see generally id. at 17 (noting that most
antifederalists "admitted the need . . . for a system of representation as a substitute
for the meeting together of all the citizens"). It followed that, for the antifederalists,
the problem with representative government was the difficulty of keeping representa-
tives directly answerable to their constituents. See id. As a result, antifederalists
advocated short legislative terms, frequent rotation of representatives, and the elec-
tion of numerous representatives to facilitate a closer connection with each constitu-
ent. See id. at 17 & n.15. For example, the antifederalist Malacton Smith argued
that representatives should be "a true picture of the people" and feared that the fed-
eral legislature would become a "natural aristocracy," id. at 17, unrepresentative of
the "middling classes." Id. at 18.
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ordinary citizens.' The English settlers of Pitcairn's Island, the
* antifederalist quickly would add, were hardly the brand of men to
be trusted with self-governance. Rather, they were mutineers who
came to the island only because they had committed a string of
capital offenses." In addition, five of the nine remaining muti-
neers were ordinary seamen95 who from all appearances lacked
the sort of education that conduces to forming a reflective and
enlightened electorate." The anfifederalist would conclude that
in such a setting the opportunistic abuse reflected in the cata-
strophic land division plan could be expected to manifest itself.
Although evaluating this argument entails a calculus of im-
ponderables, much can be said against it. As to the character of
the island's settlers, painting them as a hopeless lot of bizarre
and incurable criminals may well be too extreme. By their own
account, the men mutinied only in response to the barbarous
treatment they had received at the hands of the notorious Cap-
tain Bligh.' On the island itself, all of the settlers worked in-
dustriously and cooperatively together in the early years.98
Nordhoff and Hall saw even the least refined of the English set-
tlers as being "no better and no worse than the run of English
seamen."' Although the sailors probably lacked formal educa-
tion, the same was true of many, if not most, ordinary citizens of
eighteenth-century America."® Antifederalist theory envisioned
that education would come in large measure through participa-
tion in the democratic process;0 1 yet the faction that emerged
on Pitcairn's Island learned through their own participation in
that process only how to exploit it, rather than how to use it for
93. See id., at 16-17.
94. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
95. See NORDHOFF & HALL, MUTINY ON THE BOUNTY, supra note 1, at 162-63.
96. See 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 21.
97. See NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at 13, 29.
98. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
99. NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN'S ISLAND, supra note 1, at 164.
100. Alexis de Tocqueville, commenting on education in early-19th-century America,
observed that there were 'few learned individuals." 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE-
MOCRACY IN AMERICA 52 (Phillips Bradley ed., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1956) (1835).
101. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 21 (noting that to
antifederalists "[t]he small republic was seen as a school of citizenship as much as a
scheme for government").
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the public good.' °2 The antifederalist emphasis on education,
Madisonians would say, overestimates its potential to alter basic
tendencies of human nature, as evidenced by the corruption,
throughout human history, of innumerable leaders who had no
dearth of formal training.' In sum, the community of voters
on Pitcairn's Island may be seen as not radically different from
the communities of voters the antifederalists were prepared to
empower in the towns and villages of America. If this is so, the
story of the Pitcairners casts a long shadow over the
antifederalist idealization of small-scale governments directly
run by citizens themselves.
A second ground exists upon which antifederalists could dis-
tance their optimistic theories of localized self-rule from the di-
sastrous experiment of Pitcairn's Island: they might say that
unlike the residents of eighteenth-century American communi-
ties, the inhabitants of Pitcairn's Island were marked by extremes
of heterogeneity from which they had no chance to flee." 4
To Madison, as we have seen, a central safeguard against the
danger of majority faction was to expand the political communi-
ty to create "a greater variety of parties" so that "any one party"
would become unable "to outnumber and oppress the rest.""5
The antifederalists, in contrast, argued that security lay in
breaking up the nation into small political communities marked
by a singularity of outlook. "In a republic, the manners, senti-
ments, and interests of the people should be similar. If this be
not the case, there will be a constant clashing of opinions; and
the representatives of one part will be continually striving
against those of the other.""6 The existence of many autono-
mous political units held another advantage: it afforded citizens
102. See supra notes 25-59 and accompanying text.
103. For example, Joseph Stalin received formal education, including four years at
a theological seminary, until the age of twenty. See Stalin, 28 THE NEW ENCY-
CLOPEDIA BRrANNICA 181 (15th ed. 1993).
104. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
105. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 73, at 135.
106. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 369 (quoting an
antifederalist commentator identified as "Brutus").
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unhappy with their political lot the ready option of leaving it be-
hind by voting with their feet.' °7
This ready opportunity to relocate simply was not available on
Pitcairn's Island. Two ill-fated attempts to escape the island,"°8
antifederalists would say, highlighted the importance of the op-
portunity to relocate. Antifederalists also would claim that the
availability of this option was of particular importance on
Pitcairn's Island due to the extraordinary heterogeneity of its
people. Thrown together upon four square miles of land were the
offspring of two cultures literally a world apart. It is not surpris-
ing, antifederalists would say, that in circumstances so uniquely
fraught with the potential for factional division an experiment in
democratic self-rule would fail. At the least, the antifederalist
might note, the catastrophe that befell Pitcairn's Island teaches
nothing about the prospects of their own model of democratic
self-rule in the profoundly different circumstances that prevailed
on the American continent.
One difficulty with this effort to distance antifederalist theory
from Pitcairn's Island is that it oversells the value of jurisdic-
tion-fleeing as an antidote to faction. This is so because voting
with one's feet itself may result from the most egregious forms
of factional overreaching. What if, for example, the settlers on
Pitcairn's Island had not burned the Bounty so that the Tahi-
tians could have sailed for another island? Would this option
have made the land-seizure plan launched by Martin, McCoy,
Mills, Quintal, and Williams any less blameworthy, any less op-
pressive, or any less the result of factional excess? Even assum-
ing the existence of an escape route, the islanders could have
taken it only at the cost of abandoning their homes, their tem-
ple, and the land they had worked for years to make life-sus-
taining. Such an injustice more properly is seen as the result of
factional oppression than as an answer to it.
Antifederalists might respond that the existence of the escape
option could have nipped factional oppression in the bud. On
this view, the land-division plan never would have surfaced as a
serious proposal if an opportunity to escape the island had exist-
107. STONE ET AL, supra note 84, at 18.
108. See supra notes 33, 61 and accompanying text.
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ed. Why? Because driving the Tahitians away would not have
been in the English sailors' self-interest; rather, it was in their
interest to keep the Tahitians nearby so that they could help
work the land. The difficulty with this argument is that it rests
on an implausible sense of the seamen's incentives; it is no less
likely that those seamen would have welcomed the chance to
drive the "barbarians" in their midst from a well-established and
increasingly crowded island. No less problematically, the out-
come that this argument posits-that is, the retention of the
Tahitian males on Pitcairn's Island-seems inconsistent with
the basic antifederalist premise that smaller, homogeneous com-
munities are preferable to larger, more heterogeneous ones.0 9
In short, the American Constitution rests on the premise that
the overarching danger to any political community organized
around the popular will is the tyranny of majority faction. The
events on Pitcairn's Island, as reported by Nordhoff and Hall,
bear out this insight in blood.
B. Checked and Divided Government
Having identified the risk of factional oppression as the cen-
tral danger confronting a popular government, America's Consti-
tution-makers sought to forge a political structure to neutralize
this problem. Already we have seen one way in which the
Madisonians acted to advance this objective: by channelling in-
creased power to a far-flung multijurisdictional national govern-
ment, so as to complicate efforts by the many groups that make
up the political community to form a majority faction."' The
framers' efforts to counter the operation of faction, however,
hardly stopped here.
It is ironic that many readers of Pitcairn's Island instinctively
view Christian's establishment of a highly democratic govern-
ment as compatible with American political theory. The irony
exists because, as the preceding discussion has revealed, the
town-meeting form of rule chosen by Christian was exactly the
sort of government structure most roundly condemned by Madi-
109. See 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 15.
110. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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son."' In addition, although Madison recognized the need for
popular government, he also argued that it was in and through
the popular assembly, the arm of government closest to and
most representative of the people themselves, that factional tyr-
anny was most likely to surface." "In republican government,"
Madison wrote, "the legislative authority necessarily predomi-
nates.""' Thus, "it is against the enterprising ambition of [the
legislative] department that the people ought to indulge all their
jealousy and exhaust all their precautions.""' In short, for
Madison, an essential element of any constitutional plan was to
put checks on the legislative power."'
In the scheme that emerged from the constitutional convention
these checks were numerous and sophisticated."' Powers were
divided between competing layers of government at the state and
federal levels."' At the national level, joint action of two sepa-
rate legislative houses was required to take any action," 8 thus
111. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
112. See THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 343 (James Madison) (Benjamin Fletcher
Wright ed., 1961) ("The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of
its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex."); id. No. 49, at 350
("We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandize-
ment of the legislative at the expense of the other departments."); id. No. 71, at 460
(Alexander Hamilton) (citing the 'tendency of the legislative authority to absorb ev-
ery other").
113. Id. NO. 51, supra note 78, at 356.
114. Id. No. 48, supra note 112, at 344.
115. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944-51 (1983) (noting the
'profound convictions of the Framers that the powers conferred on Congress were
the powers to be most carefully circumscribed").
116. As stated in The Federalist No. 9:
The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduc-
tion of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed
of judges holding their offices during good behavior [and] the representa-
tion of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election
serve [as] means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of repub-
lican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or
avoided.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra note 86, at 125; see generally id. NO. 51, supra note
78 (noting security provided by competing state and federal governments, division of
the legislature into different branches, provision for different modes of election, and
creation of the veto power).
117. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (limiting the power of the Congress through enu-
meration of its powers); see also id. amend. X (reserving powers not delegated to the
federal government to the states).
118. See id. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (requiring concurrence of both houses before present-
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forcing any faction bent on pursuing an oppressive agenda to
capture two assemblies, rather than only one.11 The framers
further reduced the risk of factional capture of the legislature by
assigning members of the Senate and House differing constituen-
cies, differing terms, and differing modes of selection. 20 A free-
standing executive branch was vested with the veto'2' and oth-
er great powers"' for the purpose of providing a counterweight
to legislative excesses. A judicial branch was established as
well and given ample means by the constitutional docu-
ment-particularly after ratification of the Bill of Rights-to
impede legislative overreaching. 1"' In sum, the framers re-
ing a bill to the President).
119. As stated in THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 78, at 356-57:
In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predomi-
nates. The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into
different branches; and to render them, by different modes of election
and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as
the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on
society will admit.
120. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, with id. art. I. § 3 (defining the composition,
terms, and selection of the Senate and the House of Representatives). See, e.g., THE
FEDERALIST No. 63, supra note 11, at 415 (advocating establishment of the Senate
"as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions"). In-
deed, Madison defended establishment of the Senate in terms that speak hauntingly
to the events on Pitcairn's Island:
[Tihere are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimu-
lated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled by
the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures
which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and
condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference
of some temperate and respectable body of citizens, in order to check the
misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people
against themselves, until reason, justice, and truth can regain their au-
thority over the public mind?
Id.
121. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, ci. 2.
122. See, e.g., id. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President shall be commander-in-
chief of the armed forces, granting the President the power to make treaties with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and granting the President the power to ap-
point justices of the Supreme Court and other officers of the government).
123. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 78; see also id. No. 73, at 469 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (stating that the veto power "establishes a salutary check upon the
legislative body, calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction,
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to
influence a majority of that body").
124. See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing the judicial branch and providing that
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sponded to the danger of legislative tyranny by dispersing and
checking legislative powers in a way that favored government
inaction whenever factional abuse was threatened."2
No similar checks on the legislative power existed on
Pitcairn's Island, even though structures for checking legislative
excesses could have been put in place. Christian, for example,
could have retained a veto power over legislative action.'26 In-
deed, if an executive veto patterned on the American model had
been in place, the vote that ultimately doomed the colony would
have been without legal effect: Christian would have vetoed the
federal judges would hold office during good behavior and that their salaries could not
be diminished while they held office). The Federalists clearly viewed the judiciary as a
means of preventing legislative overreaching. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 490, 494
(Alexander Hamilton) (describing the judiciary as an "excellent barrier to the encroach-
ments and oppressions of the representative body" and an institution designed to
guard against "serious oppressions of the minor party in the community").
125. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 123, at 470 ("It is far less probable,
that culpable views of any kind should infect all the parts of the government at the
same moment and in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns
govern and mislead every one of them."). Notably, as this discussion suggests, the
so-called "gridlock" that frustrates many voters today may be seen as an intended
consequence of the federalists' decision to impose significant checks on legislative
powers. In contrast:
While accepting the need for a separation of functions . .. the Anti-Fed-
eralists became uneasy as concern shifted to what we have called a sepa-
ration and balancing of power. They conceded only reluctantly the insuffi-
ciency of simple popular government and they were likely to judge consti-
tutional arrangements according to how well they secured popular respon-
sibility ....
1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 62.
126. Indeed, the Nordhoff and Hall chronicle implies that Christian may have
planned to assert such a power, albeit in contravention of the original compact that
provided for pure popular rule, if there persisted a five to four majority vote to di-
vide the land to the exclusion of the Tahitians. See NORDHOFF & HALL, PITCAIRN's
ISLAND, supra note 1, at 164. In particular, after the vote on the land-division plan,
Christian and Young discussed what should be done to save the community. In reply
to Young's statement that the seamen would "make slaves" of the Tahitians, Chris-
tian said, "Make a slave of Minarii? Or of Tetahiti? For their own sakes I hope they
attempt nothing so mad!" Id. at 163. It was in reply to this statement that Young
ventured that the men were no worse than "the run of English seamen," but that a
"life like ours seems to bring out all that is bad in them." Id. at 164. Christian re-
sponded that unless the men led by McCoy changed their minds he would be forced
to take "stern measures, for [McCoy's] own good." Id. Young then stated: "Aye, we
are facing a crisis. I fear it was a mistake to give them the vote. You'll have to
play the captain once more, to save them from their own folly!" Id
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action, a two-thirds override would not have materialized'
(because there were only five of nine votes favoring the land-
division scheme), and Christian need not have given an equivo-
cal answer when Tetahiti asked whether the Tahitians were
soon to become landless serfs. No less significantly, if a veto
power had existed on Pitcairn's Island, the sailors might never
even have launched their ill-conceived proposal, given the likeli-
hood that it ultimately would have met with failure."
Other faction-thwarting structures also were available to the
constitution-makers of Pitcairn's Island. Christian and his fol-
lowers, for example, might have put in place a bicameral deci-
sion-making process, requiring the consent of a majority both of
the "officers" (Christian, Young, and Brown) and of the six
"nonofficer" seamen. Alternatively, Christian might have opted
for a government that gave a veto to a majority of the officers
subject to override by a supermajority of six or seven votes. Ei-
ther of these systems would have been much more akin to the
American model than the pure democracy that Christian put in
place. Either of these systems also would have rendered insuffi-
cient the bare five to four majority vote in favor of the cata-
strophic land-division plan.
Would the sailors have stood for a constitutional structure
that frustrated the will of the majority? It seems likely that they
would have. Such structures, after all, long have been accepted
by even the world's most democratic societies. And sailors accus-
tomed to the ironhanded rule of sea captains may well have
been particularly willing to vest in Christian a greater measure
of power than a single, equal vote.
No one can know how the story of Pitcairn's Island would
have unfolded had its settlers established some structure for
checking the legislative majority's powers. Perhaps the excesses
of the sailors would have triggered civil war with the islanders
in any event. Perhaps in time the five seamen would have
127. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
128. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 123, at 472 ("When men, engaged in
unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a quarter which
they cannot control, they will often be restrained by the bare apprehension of oppo-
sition, from doing what they would with eagerness rush into, if no such external
impediments were to be feared.").
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gained support sufficient to push through their land-division
scheme or some equally destructive government program. Per-
haps the smallness and heterogeneity of the society rendered it
so predestined to calamity that even the most carefully con-
structed government structure could not have averted disaster.
One matter, however, seems beyond dispute: if some meaningful
brake on majority action had been established when the island
was settled in 1789, there would have been less likelihood in
1793 that a short-sighted political plan would have precipitated
a bloodbath in the colony.
C. Constitutional Inclusion
Every thought in the preceding discussion proceeds from the
same assumption made by Christian as he approached
Pitcairn's Island: that only Englishmen were to play a part in
the new society's governance. By way of this assumption, Chris-
tian excluded altogether from participating in his "democracy"
two-thirds of the island's inhabitants, for eighteen of the twen-
ty-seven settlers were Tahitian men and women. Perhaps this
choice was inevitable, given the Eurocentric world view of eigh-
teenth-century English sailors. Perhaps it was inevitable be-
cause the notion of egalitarian popular rule would have been
too unfamiliar to Tahitians of that day. Perhaps it was inevita-
ble because in 1789 the islanders and Englishmen were too far
removed from each other in language, customs, and world-view
to attempt to cooperate in this manner. Yet the choice to ex-
clude the Tahitians from the island's governance surely was a
fateful one, for it paved the way for "majority" approval by the
colony's "legislature" of McCoy's catastrophic program.
It may seem odd that Christian purported to establish a de-
mocracy on Pitcairn's Island, even while excluding from the
franchise more than half the island's population. It seems less
odd when one recalls that the framers of the American Constitu-
tion did exactly the same thing. The story of the Constitution's
initial adoption is one of far-reaching exclusion, for the original
constitutional document countenanced a franchise limited essen-
tially to white and moneyed men.129 The story of the
129. See Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States
1997] 671
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Constitution's development, however, is, in striking contrast, one
of ever-increasing inclusion.
Study of the constitutional amendments typically focuses on
the protections of liberty and equality built into the Bill of
Rights30 and the Civil War Amendments. 3' Similarly, when
one thinks of the structural components of our government, one
typically focuses on the original, pre-amendment Constitution,
for it is there that the framers treated the issues of nationalism,
federalism, and the separation of powers.'32 In reality, howev-
er, the constitutional amendments expansively treat the most
basic element of governmental structure-the definition and
powers of the national electorate. The Fifteenth Amendment,'33
for example, bars denial of the vote on the basis of race or color.
The Nineteenth Amendment"3  outlaws discrimination in
granting the vote on the basis of sex. The Twenty-Fourth
Amendment enfranchised the poor by precluding poll taxes for
national elections.'35 The Fourteenth Amendment,'36 as in-
terpreted by the Supreme Court, further expanded the franchise
and broadly guarded against its dilution in state and local elec-
tions.'37 The Twenty-Sixth Amendment3 8 extended the vote
to young adults by enfranchising all Americans eighteen years of
age or older. This string of amendments, together with a bevy of
court rulings that broadly have expanded and given meaning to
the right to vote, 3 9 make clear that a key aspect of our consti-
tutional order has been the strong movement toward facilitating
the participation by all citizens in the processes of government.
Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987).
130. U.S. CONST. amends. I-X.
131. Id. amends. XIII-XV.
132. See supra Part II.
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
134. Id. amend. XIX
135. Id. amend. XXIV.
136. Id. amend. XIV.
137. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
139. See cases cited supra note 137.
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This tendency undoubtedly reflects an evolutionary honing of
the American sense of human dignity and equality. It also re-
flects, however, a logical extension of the Madisonian remedy for
faction. Shifting power from a panoply of smaller political units
to a single larger one, after all, is not the only way of "compre-
hending in the society so many separate descriptions of citizens
as will render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole
very improbable, if not impracticable." 4 ' Broadly extending the
franchise to many and varying "descriptions of citizens" also sti-
fles the emergence of an oppressive majority faction.
How would the tale of Pitcairn's Island have turned out if
Christian in some way had involved the Tahitians as partners in
the colony's governance? First, even a minimal inclusion of the
islanders-for example, by allowing only Minarii to vote-would
have blocked the emergence of a legislative majority supportive
of McCoy's fateful land-division scheme. Second, representation
of the Tahitians on the island's legislative council would have
made even the proposal of McCoy's plan most difficult, for if the
Tahitians had been represented, maintaining secrecy in propos-
ing and adopting the plan would have been impossible.41 Fi-
nally, an initial inclusion of the islanders in the governance of
the colony would have brought the Englishmen and the island-
ers together in a way that might have begun to neutralize the
underlying prejudices that spawned McCoy's plan in the first
place. Inclusion in the electorate of any group serves an educa-
tive function by communicating to even the most intolerant
members of society the propriety of that group's claim to respect
and acceptance in the community. In addition, the forced inter-
action of differing groups that necessarily comes with the joint
handling of government affairs holds the potential to heighten
understanding and tolerance, so as to weave people together.
In all of these ways, constitutional inclusion of the Tahitians
in the island's governance could have altered the history of the
Pitcairn colony. It might well, in particular, have neutralized the
140. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 78, at 358.
141. See id, No. 10, supra note 73, at 135 (noting "that, where there is a con-
sciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by
distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary").
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emergence of a majority faction whose pursuit of short-sighted
self-interest ultimately consumed the society.
III. AN AFTERWORD ON THE ANTIFEDERALisT UTOPIA
The real message from Pitcairn's Island, antifederalists might
assert, does not lie in the bloodbath that decimated the original
colony. Rather, antifederalists might claim that their vision of
self-government was vindicated on Pitcairn's Island by the thriv-
ing community formed in the wake of the settlement's time of
violence and debauchery. According to this argument, the cohe-
sive community discovered by the crew of the Topaz in 1808
presents the very picture of the antifederalist utopia: the small,
homogeneous, and smoothly running society devoted to public-
spirited goals, transcending selfish individual pursuits.'42
The predicate of this argument seems well founded, for a re-
markably well-functioning community was discovered on
Pitcairn's Island when outsiders finally arrived there. For three
separate reasons, however, the emergence of an idealized state
on Pitcairn's Island falls far short of confirming the
antifederalist vision of the proper governance of America.
First, the society discovered on Pitcairn's Island in 1808 was
not, in reality, a society at all. The island instead was peopled
by a single family, headed by the island's sole surviving male
and knit together by an extraordinary closeness in all aspects of
life. That a utopian tranquility could emerge in such a rarified
communal setting hardly suggests that anything similar was
reproducible in the cities and towns of eighteenth-century Amer-
ica. It suggests even less about the desirability of largely autono-
mous local government in an era when most citizens live in
great metropolitan centers.
Second, even if the island community discovered in 1808 were
viewed more as a society than as a family, it surely was not a
democratic society. Rather, the society was governed by a single,
albeit benevolent, leader. Such a political system hardly reflects
the antifederalist conception of an actively self-governing com-
munity.
142. See supra notes 90-108 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the utopian community that emerged on Pitcairn's
Island was gained only at a terrible price. In keeping with the
antifederalist vision, the homogeneity that existed on Pitcairn's
Island in 1808 produced a high degree of cohesiveness and har-
mony. That homogeneity emerged, however, only through the
death, in most cases by murder, of the island's more "heteroge-
neous" members.
IV. CONCLUSION
The central critique of the political theory advanced by the
antifederalists is that it was unworkable. Even in 1787, Ameri-
can locales were sufficiently vibrant, populous, and intertwined
that there simply "was no possibility of instituting the small
republic.""" The fate of Pitcairn's Island, however, suggests a
more fundamental flaw in antifederalist thought. On the island,
a small republic was feasible, was put in place, and was, in the
end, a catastrophic failure. The implication is that the
antifederalists' main error, and the fatal error of Fletcher Chris-
tian in constructing his own society's constitution, lay in embrac-
ing a form of government ultimately "dependent for its goodness
and trustworthiness on the everyday goodness and trustworthi-
ness of the people.""
Such a government, Madison foresaw, was destined to collapse
into the tyranny of majority faction. Building on this Madisonian
premise, the architects of our Constitution framed what Fletcher
Christian failed to provide to his colony: a governmental struc-
ture that was sensitive to the danger of faction, that negated
this danger through checked and divided government, and that
over time evolved to embrace all citizens affected by the political
process as eligible participants in it. The government estab-
lished on Pitcairn's Island was, to paraphrase Madison, "as short
in life" as it was "violent in death."45 The American constitu-
tional experiment has been, in contrast, "remarkably, if not
gloriously, successful." 46
143. See 1 THE C0MPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 71.
144. I& at 72.
145. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 73, at 133.
146. 1 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 75, at 72.
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